Last July, at its annual meeting in Rome, the UN
Pension Board forcefully rejected the most important findings of a UN internal comprehensive governance audit
called for by the General Assembly (A/73/341, see link 1 below) that found structural deficiencies on the Board and conflicts of interest, and the appearance of collusion, in the Board’s oversight of the Fund.
The Board also moved to discredit the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) by unsubstantiated charges that the audit process was “flawed and unprofessional” and that the audit contained inaccuracies (see OIOS responses to the Board in link 2 below).
The Board also moved to discredit the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) by unsubstantiated charges that the audit process was “flawed and unprofessional” and that the audit contained inaccuracies (see OIOS responses to the Board in link 2 below).
The Board further moved to reinforce its non-transparent and repressive practices by attempting to bar whistleblowers from participating on the Board. It hopes to do so by inducing the General Assembly to change a 63-year-old Fund regulation. The change would prevent appeals of certain Board decisions by limiting the jurisdiction of the United Nations Appeals Tribunal
(UNAT).
The proposed change to Article 48 of the Fund's regulations, which has been in effect since 1955, along with amendments to Article 4 that
would allow the Board to “adopt its own rules of procedure”, would effectively
give the Board carte blanche over decisions that fly in the face of principles of fairness and transparency.
There’s no mystery about what’s behind the Board’s action.
Two UN participant representatives to the Board (of six UN participant
representatives who represent 85,000 active staff) are Fund Secretariat staff
members who’ve been outspoken, as staff representatives, in bringing to light
issues of mismanagement in the Fund Secretariat.
In 2017, when the two Fund staff representatives (Ibrahima
Faye and Michelle Rockcliffe) stated their intention to run for election to the
Board as UN participant representatives, the Fund’s legal officer fired off a
letter to the polling officer voicing the Fund’s objection on the ground that
since the Board oversees the work of the CEO/Secretary, it would be a serious
conflict of interest for Fund staff to serve on the Board.
In trying to make the Fund’s argument,
the lawyer cited a twenty-five year old
case of a Fund staff representative who, in 1992, stated his intention to run
for election to the Board. The then CEO requested the views of the UN Office of
Legal Affairs. OLA opined that since the Board oversees the work of the CEO,
his staff member could not be his boss.
What the opinion seemed to overlook is that the Board is made up of 33
members; no one member supervises the CEO.
The staff
member took his case to the UN Joint Appeals Board which overruled the legal
opinion thus allowing him to run. He lost the election. The JAB reasoned that
preventing him from running for election would deprive him of the rights that
ascribe to all participants of the Fund. In other words, a change to the Regulation would result in discrimination and double standards.
The polling officers responded to the Fund’s lawyer by
noting that no Fund regulation existed that prevented Fund staff from running
for election to the Pension Board.
The two staff
representatives ran for election and won. The matter was brought to the Fund’s
Standing Committee (which takes decisions when the Board is not in session).
The Committee barred the participation of any UN member from its meeting,
claiming a conflict of interest.
It’s unclear who brought the case to the Standing Committee. A
broadcast from the former Board Chair dated 30 May 2017 stated: “As Chairman of the Pension Board, I have been
engaged with the Bureau of the Board and after consultations, including with
the United Nations, it has been decided that a Standing Committee meeting will
be convened….” (see broadcast below).
The Standing Committee decided that allowing Fund staff running for
election to the Board constituted a conflict of interest and blocked the two elected UN
participant representatives from
attending the Board in 2017. They took
their case to the UN Appeals Tribunal (UNAT) whose ruling is binding and not
appealable. They won their cases and were seated on the Board (see links 3 and 4 to UNAT
judgments dated 27 October 2017.)
The UNAT vacated the decision of the Standing Committee “in
its entirety”, which means that since the Board used the 1992 opinion as its
main argument that allowing staff of the Fund to sit on the board constituted a
conflict of interest, the Tribunal, in arriving at its decision, had considered
the conflict of interest argument.
The staff members had argued in their case that the issue of
potential conflict of interest applied to all members of the Board who should
recuse themselves in any case of actual or reasonable perception of conflict.
It should be noted that the two did
recuse themselves from the Selection Panel and discussions on the Deputy CEO
selection at the 2018 Board.
The existing text of Fund regulation 48, jurisdiction of the
United Nations Appeals Tribunal states as follows:
“Applications alleging
the non-observance of these Regulations arising out of the decisions be
submitted directly to the United Nations Appeals Tribunal….”
The proposed text is as follows (proposed changes in bold):
“Applications alleging
the non-observance of these Regulations in
regard to rights affecting participation, contributory service and benefit
entitlements under the Regulations arising out of decisions of the Standing Committee acting on behalf of the
Pension Board under Section K of the
Administrative Rules may be submitted directly to the United Nations
Appeals Tribunal….”
What the proposed revision is meant to accomplish is to both
limit the types of decisions that are eligible to be appealed to the Tribunal
and to extend the Regulation’s applicability to decisions of the Standing
Committee.
It’s worth noting that in 2012 when a Fund staff member, now
the Board Chair (see link 5 below), ran for election to the Board, neither the Fund management nor OLA raised a conflict of interest objection.
(He lost).
Apparently, in the minds of the Fund management and its
supporters in OLA, a conflict of interest exists only when the staff involved
are union representatives, who primarily have the interests of staff (owners of
the Fund) at heart.
What would a change in the Regulation mean in practical terms
for Faye and Rockcliffe? Even if it’s approved by the GA, under Article 50 of
the Fund’s Regulations “no provision
shall be construed as applying retroactively…unless expressly stated therein or
specifically amended by the GA”.
So even if they succeed, the architects of the change can’t
prevent the two staff representatives from serving out their term. What they’re
trying to do in overturning 63 years of law is to prevent them from running
again, and prevent any Fund staff, and staff of all Staff Pension Committee
Secretariats, from running.
But with more power in its hands, will the Board stop there?
Or will it in the future try to apply another limitation to prevent yet another
group of the Fund’s owners from being democratically elected? (It appears that
WHO has been violating the regulations since at least 2015, see below).
It’s not surprising that a Board that believes itself to be
under siege by exposure of its abject shortcomings in the OIOS governance audit
might move to fortify itself from criticism or for that matter, from basic
transparency.
Paragraph 30 of the Board’s 2018 report (A/73/9) notes that
“in 2015 the Board had approved a declaration on confidentiality and conflict
of interest for all members to sign.” In fact, the Board has attempted repeatedly to
silence the UN participant representatives, including trying to prevent them
from using the UN internal broadcast system to provide information to their
constituents.
The Board Chair, at the July meeting of the Board “noted
some negative practices that had emerged in recent years by a very small
minority that had created a false narrative and potentially jeopardized the
good governance of the Fund [and] stated that it was imperative to stop these practices
immediately”(A/73/9, para. 29).
Who is this amorphous“very small minority” and what is the
”false narrative” about which the Chair so vaguely laments? Does it include UN oversight
bodies such as the Board of Auditors and OIOS whose reports detail
mismanagement in the Fund Secretariat, aided and abetted by structural deficiencies on the Board and by shortcomings in
Board oversight?
What the Fund Secretariat management and the Board are
afraid of is on full display for all to read in the revealing comprehensive
governance audit which is currently the topic of discussion in the General Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee, as is the proposal to change the Regulation.
In the meantime, the Board’s new Succession Committee – established without terms of reference – which is basically a reshuffling of a Board group that OIOS found to have employed “deviations and arbitrariness” in selecting a candidate for Deputy CEO who reportedly did not meet the job qualifications and withdrew his candidacy, is charged with a selecting a new CEO and a Deputy CEO.
A former
Board member from OLA (one of the Secretary-General’s representatives to the
Board from 2004 to 2016 who keeps a hand in Fund matters through his membership on the
Assets and Liabilities Committee) wrote the legal opinion 25 years ago. He's a primary promoter of the Regulation
change, and has reportedly attended Fifth Committee meetings to argue for change. There are reports that he 's tapped for the position of Acting CEO, or CEO now that it's official that former CEO Sergio Arvizu will separate from the UN on 7 January 2019.
The Board appears not to recognize that its dysfunction is
a matter of record, including in the OIOS governance audit, and that no amount of manipulation of Fund regulations or repression
of dissenting voices can wrestle that genie back into the bottle.
The Board's push to change a 63 year old law reflects its tendency to dig in deeper when
faced with evidence of its, and the Fund management's, non-transparent and undemocratic practices in flouting the Fund's rules and regulations. (OIOS will hopefully look into reports that the former CEO's disability case was passed through the IAEA Staff Pension Committee, against Fund rules).
Fund members should hope that the General Assembly, which had sound reasons for calling for a comprehensive governance audit, will not allow this shameful attempt to stamp out equity and justice from our Pension Fund.
Fund members should hope that the General Assembly, which had sound reasons for calling for a comprehensive governance audit, will not allow this shameful attempt to stamp out equity and justice from our Pension Fund.
3. http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat/judgments/2017-UNAT-807.pdf
4. http://www.un.org/en/oaj/files/unat/judgments/2017-UNAT-801.pdf
5. http://unpension.blogspot.com/2018/08/un-pension-board-chair-lacking.html
-------------------------------------------
1. A single worldwide election of representatives of the participants to the WHO Staff Pension Committee for the three-year period 2016-2018 is to take place this year.
2. The Second World Health Assembly, held in June 1949, decided in resolution WHA2.49 that the WHO Staff Pension Committee would be made up of nine members (and nine alternates), three of whom would be appointed by the World Health Assembly, three by the Director-General and three elected by the participants (members of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund).
3. The elections will be organized and supervised by Polling Officers at WHO Headquarters appointed jointly by all the Staff Associations.
4. All participants in the Joint Staff Pension Fund, except the following: holders of contracts of less than one year, the Polling Officers, the Secretary of the WHO Staff Pension Committee at Headquarters, and any person at Headquarters or in the Regions whose official functions involve the handling of pension matters, are eligible to submit their candidature for election to the six vacant seats - three members and three alternates - for a three-year term of office.
To that end, each candidate must access the nomination form at the following URL:
http://intranet.who.int/asp/datacol/survey.asp?survey_id=7806
and respond to all questions. Candidates are also invited to submit a photograph.
In the event of a technical problem in submitting the form, the information and photograph can be sent by e-mail to the following address: pollingofficers@who.int
Nominations must reach the Polling Officers by 9 December 2015.
5. The ballot will be conducted electronically. The voting form, including biographical information submitted by the candidates, will be made available in electronic format to participants of the Joint Staff Pension Fund as soon as possible after 10 December 2015. Access to the voting form is protected by a unique user code and password. The vote is strictly anonymous.
6. The three candidates for the Pension Committee who receive the largest number of votes shall be declared elected as members for three years. The three candidates obtaining the next largest
number of votes shall be declared elected as alternates.
In the event of resignation, separation from service or death of a member, the alternate who received the largest number of votes at the last election shall fill the vacancy.
In the event of an alternate's appointment as member in accordance with the preceding paragraph, or in the event of the resignation, separation from service or death of an alternate, the candidate who received the next largest number of votes at the last election after those designated as alternates shall be appointed.
7. All participants in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF), particularly those seeking nomination as a candidate or countersigning a candidature nomination form, are urged to study the Regulations and Rules of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, obtainable from the Pension Fund web site (www.unjspf.org).
Members elected will represent participants on the WHO Staff Pension Committee (Article 6 of the Regulations) and will appoint from among themselves a member and an alternate member to the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board (Article 5). Elected members should therefore have a good knowledge of the mechanisms that exist to deal with pension matters through the tripartite system, or be prepared to make a thorough study of this subject. The UNJSP Board meets in regular session once a year at a time and place decided by the Board or its Standing Committee.
In addition, members are called upon to review cases for disability benefits under the Regulations and Rules of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund as distinct from claims made under Article 6.2 of the Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the World Health Organization.
______________________________
No comments:
Post a Comment