The newly adopted General Assembly resolution, in setting the stage for sweeping governance reforms (Ian Richards' post today, http://unpension.blogspot.com/2018/12/general-assembly-calls-for-sweeping.html), requires “unfaltering accountability” of the UN Pension Board, and calls for the Fund Secretariat’s senior
management to be held accountable for its performance regarding delays in benefits
processing.
But can there be sustainable change without action pertaining to the personal responsibility of senior Fund managers and Board members for any and all financial losses caused by their negligence?
UN Administrative Instruction, ST/AI/2004/3, sets out the conditions under which UN staff "may be required to reimburse the United Nations either partially or in full for any financial loss suffered by the United Nations as a result of the staff member's gross negligence or of his or her having violated any regulation, rule or administrative instruction".
Ways must be devised to hold non-staff Pension Board members personally accountable as well for the consequences of their negligence and lack of oversight.
But can there be sustainable change without action pertaining to the personal responsibility of senior Fund managers and Board members for any and all financial losses caused by their negligence?
UN Administrative Instruction, ST/AI/2004/3, sets out the conditions under which UN staff "may be required to reimburse the United Nations either partially or in full for any financial loss suffered by the United Nations as a result of the staff member's gross negligence or of his or her having violated any regulation, rule or administrative instruction".
Ways must be devised to hold non-staff Pension Board members personally accountable as well for the consequences of their negligence and lack of oversight.
Asserting existing prerogatives
The resolution, from start to finish,
intends to demonstrate that the General Assembly means business. Up front, (5), it
asserts its “existing prerogative…on matters pertaining to the Fund”, including
that (17) OIOS (the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services) “shall remain the sole internal oversight body of the Fund’s
secretariat and investment”. That in itself is a major endorsement of the findings and recommendations of the OIOS governance audit (A/73/341) which the Assembly requested in its resolution 72/262.
Its major significance includes a vigorous pushback of the strenuous efforts of the Pension Board to denigrate and discredit the UN oversight body for its diligent and forthright audit report.
Its major significance includes a vigorous pushback of the strenuous efforts of the Pension Board to denigrate and discredit the UN oversight body for its diligent and forthright audit report.
As for the Board's request for changes to Fund Regulations, the Assembly (21) also asserts that it has “sole and ultimate authority to approve
amendments” to Fund Regulations. The Board may “adopt its own rules of
procedure” (22) but “subject to the provision” of Fund Regulations. “
The Assembly, justifiably, needs further analysis of why the Board
wants to amend Articles 6 and 48 (to prevent staff of the Fund Secretariat from
running for election to the Board; and to assert the Board’s primacy over
decisions of the UN Appeals Tribunal, respectively).
Here, the Assembly rightly smells a rat and should trust its
nose.
Working group to consider (critical and important) rejected
recommendations
The Assembly has noticed (para. 12) that the Board rejected at
least half (the most critical and important) of the recommendations of the OIOS
governance audit.
But actually, the Assembly not only wants the Board to report at
its next session on follow-up to the recommendations accepted by the Board
(para. 44).
It also wants the Board to establish a working group (para.
14) to consider (the important and even critical) recommendations that it rejected,
concerning the “issues of participation, rotation and equitable representation
on the Board” and report at its next session.
In doing so, the Assembly is careful to note, the working group should “adhere to the Tripartite Structure
of the Board” in fulfilling its mandate: i.e., governing bodies; executive
heads; and participants.
Retiree representation
The rejected recommendations to be considered include “the role of retiree representatives and
modalities to directly elect retiree representatives to the Board”. Apparently, the Assembly doesn't buy FAFICS’ (the UN retiree representative group) claim that it is “not
within the authority of the Pension Board or the General Assembly to establish
requirements for retirees to select its own retiree representatives” (FAFICS
submission to the 65th session of the Pension Board)!
Independent IPAS evaluation
Further, the Assembly requires full implementation of all Board of
Auditors recommendations (9), and an
independent assessment of the Integrated Pension Administration System (IPAS)
“within existing resources”; a report at its next session.
No more positive consultant reports on IPAS implementation, to
the tune of almost $300,000, needed.
Replacing the CEO position and avoiding conflicts of interest
But the Assembly doesn’t need a working group to tell it that it
must act now on separating the dual role of Chief Executive Officer and
Secretary to the Board (one of the recommendations rejected by the Pension
Board), the source, according to the OIOS audit, of much of the conflicts of
interest between the Board and the Fund management.
It’s very symbolic that the post of CEO will be
retired, clearly, given recent experience, to bring the functions and role of
the position down to earth, where the structure and Regulations of the Fund are
no longer under siege because of inflated ambition and power.
Therefore, “No later than 2020 (13) that post will be
replaced “by two distinct and independent positions as ‘Pension Benefits
Administrator” and ‘Secretary of the Board’.
And the Board must (25) do what needs to be done to “avoid
conflicts of interest between the management of te Fund and the constituent
groups of the Board, and report on that too.
Succession planning based on integrity and fairness
The Assembly requires “timely and proper succession planning” for the CEO
and DCEO positions “based on pre-established procedures that ensures integrity
and fairness” (while they still last).
This appears to send a message that the Board Chair’s current email
polling of Board members to request the Secretary-General to appoint an Acting CEO doesn’t cut
it, and respect must be shown for the Fund’s Regulations, i.e., approval by the
Standing Committee when the Board is not in session.
Tying performance evaluation to payment delays
The Assembly requires (27) proactive action to resolve delays in
pension payments, prioritization of the “most urgent and severe cases”, and it
wants (28) “to tie [the] performance evaluation [for the senior management of
the Pension Fund] to the “proportion of cases processed as well as to the
number of outstanding cases”.
Accountability vs responsibility
The Assembly intends to continue requiring (44) “unfaltering accountability” by the
Board and also calls for the Fund’s senior management will be held accountable
for its performance. And “faltered” they
have, both groups, more times than can be counted.
And they’ll continue to falter without relentless follow-up action by
UN oversight bodies, primarily the Assembly, but also the Board of Auditors, and OIOS, who deserve to be
commended for their diligence and clarity of vision, under fire from the Board
which cited internal UN audit body based on specious claims of a flawed and
unprofessional audit.
And much of the current progress would not have been possible without the perseverance, commitment and courage of the UN Participant
Representatives to the Board, who have worked assiduously to hold the Board and Fund management to account.
The Assembly's resolution with its strong insistence on accountability is
good and Fund members welcome it. The next step must be an insistence on responsibility
as well, i.e, holding Board members along with senior Fund staff personally responsible
for financial losses to the Fund owing to negligence and lack of oversight, and to beneficiaries waiting for months (and years in too many cases) for their
benefits.
No comments:
Post a Comment